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Intervention
Carly Martin
Dr. Seyla Benhabib’s article, “Just Membership in a Global Commu-
nity,” explores the shifting meaning of political membership in the 
current conditions of global migration. She investigates the conflict, 
in her words, the “outright contradiction,” between democratic sover-
eignty—the claim of a self-governing people to define its community by 
limiting its membership—and the recognition of the “right to belong” 
to which, according to Dr. Benhabib, any human is entitled. The very 
term global citizenship—the status of one who claims membership in a 
limited political community, while simultaneously placing him or her-
self in the community of human inhabitants of the earth—evokes this 
tension. How is it possible to assert one’s belonging in a community 
while simultaneously recognizing the rights of nonmembers, the rights 
of others, to enter into the space delimited by this community or to 
ultimately become members themselves?
I will respond to Dr. Benhabib’s essay primarily through an analysis 
of the human right to belong, and human rights in general, to which 
she appeals. After examining her discussion of the “right to have 
rights,” I will consider possible philosophical bases for such a human 
right, focusing in particular on the Kantian theory of philosopher Alan 
Gewirth. I criticize Gewirth’s portrayal of the human agent, the subject 
of human rights, as purely rational and thus “universalizable,” and I 
claim that such an understanding of the human agent may be a source 
of the tension between citizenship and human rights that Benhabib 
describes. In the end, I argue that it is precisely an understanding of 
the particularized, historical nature of human agents, an understand-
ing that one’s position is not universal, that can inform a just practice 
of citizenship.
Dr. Benhabib explores the intersection of citizenship and human 
rights through an analysis of Hannah Arendt’s phrase, “the right to 
have rights.” This phrase, she explains, evokes a growing conscious-
ness in the current era of the right of an individual to belong to a politi-
cal community. Arendt’s first use of the term right captures this right to 
belong, this “human right to membership,” in Benhabib’s words. The 
second use of the term rights refers to the rights that an individual may 
hold as a member of a political community; these are the rights that a 
citizen enjoys. He or she may, as Benhabib states, “stand in a relation 
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of reciprocal duty” to other members of the community, and others 
must “recognize [this individual] as a member, as one who is protected 
by the legal-political authorities and treated as a person entitled to the 
enjoyment of rights.” Yet the status of an individual as a citizen of this 
political community, a claimant to rights in the second sense of the 
term, is dependent upon others’ recognition of this person as someone 
who can and should be a member of this community in the first place, 
evoked by the first use of the term.
Benhabib concludes her presentation by arguing that all human 
beings have the right to membership in a political community, and that 
as global citizens, we must work to affirm this universal human right 
through our own political practices. She calls upon states to recog-
nize the human rights of migrants and thus to allow refugees to enter 
their territories and to grant eventual citizenship to long-term resident 
aliens. It is the migrants’ fundamental status as human persons that 
entitles them to such political rights.
Benhabib’s argument, then, rests upon the claim that humans, as 
such, hold claim to certain rights, such as the right to belong. Yet, prob-
ing this assumption, we must ask in what sense human-ness justifies 
a claim to rights. What is it about human persons that entitles them to 
claim basic rights? What gives us the obligation to grant a refugee flee-
ing violence in his or her state entrance into the bounded territory of 
our community?
Explicitly in her article, Benhabib justifies human rights based upon 
international law and treaties formulated since the mid-twentieth cen-
tury. The 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
became the basis for later international covenants, serves as a set of 
guiding principles for the treatment of individuals by their own states, 
by foreign states, or, most pertinent to our present discussion, when 
they cross state borders. While, as Dr. Benhabib notes, these treaties 
pertain to relations between signatory states and do not currently “con-
fer rights and responsibilities directly on individuals,” such treaties 
create a legal justification for human rights, a normative momentum 
toward the increased recognition of these rights by all states. Yet a legal 
justification for human rights is not sufficient, I argue, because we 
understand humans to have rights whether or not they are enforced or 
written into a treaty. We must not justify human rights based upon the 
way we currently recognize them, but we must rather justify a form of 
treatment that all humans deserve. In this way, we require a moral or 
normative justification of universal human rights. Such a justification 
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should be able to tell us what it is about a person that gives her a claim 
to certain rights or entitlements that she may demand from other per-
sons or governments.
Western moral philosophy yields many different methods for the 
justification of human rights. We could make a utilitarian defense, 
claiming that the recognition of human rights augments humanity’s 
happiness or welfare. We could argue from intuition, stating that 
human possession of certain rights is a self-evident truth. This position 
might coincide with a defense of human rights based on religion. Or, 
with John Rawls, we could argue that individuals considering their 
society from behind a “veil of ignorance,” unaware of their social loca-
tion, would choose to invest each individual in society with certain 
rights.
Another commonly invoked justification for universal human rights 
is that based upon human agency, and it is a form of this argument 
that I will briefly sketch and critique. Contemporary philosopher Alan 
Gewirth, arguing from the tradition of Kantian moral theory, pres-
ents us with one such argument for universal human rights. Gewirth 
premises his argument upon the claim that all humans are actual, 
prospective, or potential agents; in other words, any human is, will be, 
or could be an agent insofar as she can think rationally, act, and justify 
her act to others through communication.1 An agent acts intentionally 
in that she acts to achieve a certain purpose, which she views as a good 
or worthy end.2
Certain conditions, however, are necessary in order for the agent to 
achieve her purpose. Gewirth argues that successful action requires 
two necessary conditions: the freedom and the well-being of the 
actor. Freedom, here, is the ability to control “one’s behavior by one’s 
unforced choice while having knowledge of relevant circumstances.”3 
Well-being encompasses basic goods, such as life, bodily integrity, and 
mental stability; nonsubtractive goods, such as the ability to plan for 
the future (and thus not being lied to or stolen from); and additive 
goods, such as the right to education and the right not to be discrimi-
nated against based upon race, gender, sexuality, class, religion, nation-
ality, or ability.4 Both freedom and well-being are necessary for action, 
and, insofar as the agent understands the purpose of her action to be 
a good, her faculty of reason dictates that she must take her freedom 
and well-being to be necessary goods. In order to pursue her goals 
through action, then, an agent must make the prescriptive statement 
that freedom and well-being are goods that are due to her. The agent 
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must demand the right to freedom and well-being from others in order 
to take successful action.
The agent, then, claims that she holds rights to these necessary con-
ditions of freedom and well-being. But why must she recognize the 
rights of others, of humans as such? The agent, Gewirth argues, makes 
the claim to her own rights based upon the fact that she is a ratio-
nal person and prospective agent; she claims that she deserves rights 
because she has purposes that she wants to fulfill. But she must then 
accept that any rational, purposive agent is entitled to the same rights. 
Thus, in order to ensure that the necessary conditions of her own goals 
are met, the agent must recognize the rights of other agents to demand 
these same necessary conditions.5 Each agent, in this way, ought not 
to interfere with the rights of other rational prospective agents to free-
dom and well-being, and, in some cases, must assist other agents with 
the achievement of these conditions. Through this argument for the 
universal duty of a rational person to recognize the rights of another 
equally rational person placed in his or her situation, Gewirth devel-
ops a defense for universal human rights.
At this point, in an essay of greater length, I would first evaluate the 
logical soundness of Gewirth’s argument and subsequently determine 
whether the right to political membership that Dr. Benhabib discusses 
can follow from the rights to freedom and well-being that Gewirth 
defends. Because of the constraints of this essay, however, I will assume 
that Gewirth’s theory is sound and does entail a right to political mem-
bership. I will critique Gewirth’s account of the human subject of rights 
and will enquire as to whether the notion of rights itself makes sense 
under the framework of his theory.
Gewirth argues that the exercise of rationality circumscribes human 
agency, and thus any foundation for human rights. He claims that we 
should recognize the rights of others, such as refugees’ rights to even-
tual membership in our political communities, because, possessing 
the same rational capacities, we would make the same claim to rights 
in their situation. In other words, Gewirth derives a universal claim 
to human rights by abstracting the agent from her particular situa-
tion; this abstracted rational agent is interchangeable with any other 
rational agent who, placed in her situation of potential action, would 
demand the same rights. The moral agent is constituted not by her par-
ticular history of relationships, environment, and so forth, but rather 
by the rationality that she shares with all other humans.
4
Macalester Civic Forum, Vol. 1 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/maccivicf/vol1/iss1/12
Carly Martin
67
Gewirth’s method is sensible. In order to justify a claim that all 
humans deserve the same basic forms of respect, we must consider 
moral agents in light of the fundamental qualities that unite them, 
rather than in terms of the particular contexts that make each agent’s 
life unique. At the same time, however, shouldn’t an adequate justifica-
tion of human rights account for the differential positions of agents as 
well as the qualities that make them identical? For a right—a certain 
form of treatment demanded by one person of another person or gov-
ernment—is a demand that has been, or can be, denied. One articu-
lates the concept of rights only when a petitioned form of treatment, 
such as freedom of opinion or recognition as a member of a politi-
cal community, is denied or threatened. In other words, the notion 
of rights becomes meaningful only when humans situated in specific 
circumstances are denied the basic, requisite conditions for survival, 
happiness, or agency. In this way, it seems that any adequate account 
of human rights must comprehend agents both in terms of their uni-
versalizable qualities, the bases for their fundamental identity, as well 
as in terms of the particular lived contexts that make each agent’s life 
irreducible to any other.
Hannah Arendt, as quoted by Benhabib, explains the relevance 
of historical context to the understanding of political rights. Arendt 
writes, “We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights 
(and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s 
actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized 
community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and 
could not regain these rights because of the new global political situa-
tion.”6 Referring to the rise in a global consciousness of human rights 
following the Holocaust and other atrocities of the early and mid-20th 
century, Arendt demonstrates that talk of political rights only makes 
sense in the context of a current or past threat to human political mem-
bership. In order to develop a concept of a universal right to belong, 
we must understand that the position of an agent who is a citizen, a 
member of a political community, is precisely not “interchangeable” 
with that of all other agents.
One might respond to this claim, however, by arguing that the con-
cept of the human agent as rational, and thus located in a universaliz-
able position, is presupposed within the consideration of the particular 
circumstance described above. In order to understand that the dif-
ferential treatment of humans as regards fundamental conditions for 
life and agency is wrong, we must already understand that all humans 
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deserve the same basic form of treatment. In other words, an under-
standing of the identity of all humans underlies our intuition that it is 
wrong to deny persons the basic necessities for agency. Therefore, the 
objection continues, a particularized understanding of the agent is not 
logically necessary to a defense of human rights.
I would answer, however, that the historical necessity of human 
rights, as evidenced by events like the Holocaust, is, in part, what gives 
meaning to the notion of rights and cannot be separated from it. If 
certain agents’ claims to basic conditions of well-being or, in Arendt’s 
example, political membership, were not denied or threatened, no uni-
versalistic account of rights would be necessary. In other words, the 
notion of right itself loses sense in isolation from the historical cir-
cumstances from which it has arisen. Just as the concept of rights loses 
meaning outside of the lived context of human difference, so is any 
justification of rights, based necessarily on the human subject of rights, 
nonsensical if it does not include a consideration of lived context.
If it is true that Gewirth’s failure to situate the concept of rights, 
and the human subjects of these rights, in historical context renders 
his justification of human rights incomplete, then how does this con-
clusion inform Benhabib’s discussion of democracy and the right to 
belong? First, I would argue, my analysis of Gewirth’s theory suggests 
the grounding for an adequate philosophical defense of human rights. 
Such a defense would base itself upon a consideration of the agent both 
in terms of the rational qualities that he or she shares with all other 
humans and in terms of his or her contextual and historical situation, 
although I acknowledge the difficulties of formulating such a theory.
Secondly, and more deeply, the role of historical context in compre-
hending a human subject of rights may also inform the tension between 
the practice of political belonging and human rights that Dr. Benhabib 
discusses. Tension between democratic citizenship and human rights is 
in part the result of a purely universalistic understanding of the human 
agent. Citizenship is simultaneously an affirmation of one individual’s 
membership in a state and a denial of others’ membership. Citizenship 
is, in itself, exclusive. This exclusion can lead, as Benhabib’s examples 
of political refugees demonstrates, to situations in which individuals 
are denied membership in any state, or in any state that can sustain 
them. Yet if a U.S. citizen, for example, positioned to shape U.S. citizen-
ship policy through legislation, understands her obligations to oth-
ers solely in terms of the rational capacity she shares with them, this 
reality that some excluded others are stateless cannot enter into her 
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moral calculation. A human right to belong seems meaningless unless 
she comprehends the strata of political membership that differenti-
ates human subjects and her own role in propagating this differential 
membership through exclusive membership in her state. Insofar as a 
U.S. citizen understands the human agent as purely rational and thus 
universal, the exclusivity of her citizenship cannot emerge as morally 
relevant. Citizenship understood only from the perspective of the citi-
zen, which I argue follows from a purely universalistic understanding 
of the human agent, fundamentally conflicts with the recognition of a 
human right to belong.
I suggest that integral to the practice of membership itself—namely, 
in this case, the formulation of laws that grant or deny citizenship—is 
an understanding that not all humans share one’s position of political 
membership. In order to practice citizenship justly, in a way that rec-
ognizes the rights of others to also belong, we must attempt to under-
stand the way power and privilege constitute us, and those we label 
other, as human subjects.
Notes
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